The American University of Beirut is hosting a Brown Bag lecture entitled “Private Security Firms and Conflict Outcomes: Evidence from the Second Iraq-U.S. War,” by Benjamin Tkach, in West Hall, Room 310.
Abstract: How do private security firms (PSFs) influence conflict outcomes? Contracts between PSFs and state employers are incomplete. Inclusion of PSFs’ in conflicts generates a dilemma for government employers as the former are profit-maximizing agents contracted to provide services outside established military structures.
Incomplete contracting establishes a principal-agent dynamic where information asymmetries reduce potential benefits of employing PSFs. Firm transparency is argued to reduce information asymmetries captured by corporate structure (public or private owned). Publicly traded companies are argued to provide better outcomes. Expectations are tested using a new data set on both U.S. and non-U.S. headquartered private security firms operating in Iraq from March 2003 to December 2007.